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Wage Insurance as a Policy Option in the United States 
 
 
Say a hardworking American loses his job—we shouldn’t just make sure that he 
can get unemployment insurance; we should make sure that program encourages 
him to retrain for a business that’s ready to hire him. If that new job doesn’t pay 
as much, there should be a system of wage insurance in place so that he can still 
pay his bills. 
 
Barack Obama 
State of the Union address 
January 12, 2016 
 
 
Wage insurance is a program that attempts to help permanently displaced workers 
transition to employment rapidly, effectively, and equitably. Because displaced workers have 
been found to suffer substantial earnings losses when they become reemployed, a wage insurance 
program provides a temporary wage supplement that partially reduces the wage loss experienced 
by targeted, newly reemployed workers.  While participating workers receive a “wage 
supplement,” the program is called “wage insurance” because of its design as a social insurance 
program rather than an income transfer program. 
In his State of the Union message, President Obama recently proposed wage insurance as 
a program for helping all dislocated workers as they recover from the permanent loss of a job. 
On January 16, 2017, the White House released a description of the proposed program that is to 
be incorporated in the Fiscal Year 2017 Presidential Budget Request (White House 2016). The 
specific design of the President’s proposal is to replace 50 percent of a displaced worker’s lost 
wages, up to $10,000 during a period of up to two years. All displaced workers who had been 
working for their prior employer for at least three years would be eligible for the wage 
supplement as long as they would be making less than $50,000 per year when they returned to 
work. States would be required to administer this federally funded program. 
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Wage insurance proposals of many different designs have been discussed over the past 
three decades. They have been targeted to different types of displaced workers, with different 
replacement rates, and been available for varying periods of time. The Obama wage insurance 
proposal is of a particular wage insurance design. Below is a discussion of the development of 
wage insurance as a policy option in the United States and proposals that have had varying goals 
and designs. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper reviews the research, evaluations, and policy pertaining to wage supplements 
and wage insurance. It concludes that little is known about the behavioral impacts of wage 
supplements on dislocated workers and suggests that the next policy step in this arena should be 
to conduct a large-scale, random assignment demonstration project that both evaluates the 
effectiveness of alternative wage supplement options and compares their impacts to alternative 
reemployment services and reemployment incentives. 
Since the 1980s, policymakers and researchers have examined a number of approaches to 
create reemployment incentives for dislocated workers. Two concerns have driven interest in 
this issue: 1) reducing the work disincentive effects of unemployment insurance (UI) and Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (TAA), thus speeding the return to work; and 2) compensating dislocated 
workers for the losses they experience in a dynamic economy. In turn, two types of proposals 
have emerged: 1) reemployment bonuses that try to speed reemployment simply by providing a 
small, lump-sum payment directly to workers in lieu of, or in addition to, UI; and 2) wage 
insurance or wage supplements, that is wage-loss replacement supplements that may or may not 
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be funded through an insurance mechanism but that are designed to both speed reemployment 
and partially compensate workers for their earnings losses. 
Wage supplements and wage subsidies are offered to workers or employers in the form of 
tax credits or other financial incentives. They are paid to encourage employment and increase 
workers’ earnings. Wage supplements are paid to employees, whereas wage subsidies can be 
paid to either employees or employers.  Wage supplements generally aim to encourage 
unemployed workers to go to work faster and to reduce the wage loss they experience in new 
jobs relative to the wages they earned in prior jobs.  Wage subsidies to employers have a 
different goal: they incentivize employers to hire workers they might not otherwise hire. Wage 
subsidies to employees are paid to workers only after they become employed; they are paid to 
low-wage workers with the goal of making work pay by raising compensation for work until it 
reaches a specified earnings threshold.  Because wage subsidies are only offered to workers after 
they become employed, they are not likely to speed reemployment, but as long as employees 
remain below the earnings threshold, they can encourage continued workforce participation. 
The United States has considerable experience with wage subsidies to employers in the 
form of programs and demonstration projects.  These efforts have generally served low-wage or 
disadvantaged workers. A number of programs were enacted between the 1960s and 1980s that 
included wage subsidies, including the Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS) program 
for young disadvantaged workers under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
(CETA), the Work Incentive (WIN) tax credit program for Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children recipients, on-the-job training under the Job Training Partnership Act (and now under 
the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act), the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit, and the New Jobs 
Tax Credit. In addition, several projects also tested wage supplements.  Programs that simply 
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offer subsidy payments to employers have experienced low participation rates, and, when used, 
have tended to be ineffective, with large-scale windfall effects (Katz 1996). 
Wage subsidy programs that compensate employers for hiring low-wage workers 
continue to operate today in the United States.  The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) was the 
major wage subsidy program for low-wage workers from 1979 to 1994.  It was replaced by the 
Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) and Welfare to Work Tax Credit that continue today and 
are similar to the TJTC. 
On-the-job training—wage subsidies to employers combined with reemployment services 
and training—has been found to be effective at improving employment and earnings for 
disadvantaged adults under CETA (Barnow 1987) and JTPA (Orr et al. 1995). It appears that the 
important factor in making these wage subsidies successful is the positive effect that 
reemployment services and training have on subsequent earnings and employment. 
The effect of wage subsidies in the United States has been evaluated, comparing wage 
subsidies paid to employers and those paid to employees (Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakins 
2000). The researchers conclude that wage subsidies programs paid to employers have 
experienced low participation rates and have been ineffective. By contrast, they find that wage 
subsidies paid to employees, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), are much more 
effective in targeting the population to be served, increasing workforce participation and 
supplementing earnings. 
In Europe wage subsidies paid to employees generally have been combined with 
reemployment services, such as job search assistance and training.  In this way, these programs 
are similar to on-the-job training programs in the United States. Betcherman et al. (2004) find 
that programs in Germany and Great Britain that combined these services had a modest positive 
4 
impact, but the combined service package did not have greater impacts than the provision of job 
search assistance and training provided without wage subsidies.  Reviewing a large number of 
wage subsidy programs in industrial nations, the authors find that only about one-third of the 
wage subsidies programs had positive employment effects and one-half had positive earnings 
impacts. 
Wage subsidies paid to low-wage workers aim to raise employment and earnings without 
having work disincentive effects. These programs do not try to speed the return to work; they are 
only available to people who are already working. They are programs to reduce poverty. For 
example, the largest wage subsidy in the United States is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
that now pays about $70 billion per year to over 26 million tax filers. The EITC was first 
enacted in 1975 and was expanded several times since then. It is available to all low-income 
workers who file tax returns, and its refundable provisions mean that low-wage workers may 
receive refunds even if they pay no taxes at all. The EITC is designed to be a safety net for 
people who work and have earnings; it is designed to “make work pay.” The amount received 
depends on family living arrangements and earnings.  Families with two or more children 
receive the maximum amount, while families with one child receive a lower amount. Single 
individuals without children receive only a minimal tax credit (Berlin 2007). 
In contrast to the extensive experience with wage subsidies for low-wage workers in the 
United States, the effectiveness of wage supplements for dislocated workers has not been 
evaluated. Wage supplements for dislocated workers have been analyzed theoretically and have 
been found to offer the possibility that offering wage supplements will encourage the return to 
work, increase employment, and replace part of the wage loss experienced after reemployment. 
A simulation using a job search model finds that a wage-loss subsidy of half of the wage loss 
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paid for two years would shorten unemployment spells by nearly two weeks and increase 
employment slightly, while replacing a significant portion of the wage loss experienced 
(Davidson and Woodbury 1995). In the United States, however, there has been no empirical 
testing of these findings, using either a rigorous demonstration project or an evaluation of an 
existing program.  Wage insurance is the payment of a wage-loss supplement that is paid for by 
an insurance premium levied on employers or employees.  Most proposals, however, have been 
for wage supplement programs that are not funded by insurance premiums but rather would be 
funded from other revenue sources—e.g., from the federal government 
Because a large-scale program of wage insurance/supplements for dislocated workers has 
never been tried in the United States, and therefore has not been evaluated, it is not clear what the 
impact of such a program would be. Who would receive the supplements?  What effect would 
the program have on the behavior of workers with respect to searching for work, accepting job 
offers, and retaining jobs taken?  Who would benefit from wage supplements, what percentage of 
prior wages would be replaced, and how would the distribution of benefits compare to other 
policy options?  More generally, how effective and efficient are wage supplements? 
Because of the policy interest in wage insurance/supplements, policymakers and 
researchers have wanted to find answers to some unanswered questions about the program. 
Thus, there have been several proposals to test wage insurance in a demonstration mode before 
implementing it as a full-fledged program.  The Advisory Council on Unemployment 
Compensation (1995) reviewed the potential usefulness of wage supplements to increase the U.S. 
labor supply and considered the usefulness of introducing it as a new reemployment policy 
initiative. Finding that “there are no experiments on the effect of wage subsidies to workers,” the 
commission speculated, based on evaluations of the reemployment bonus experiments, that 
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“subsidizing workers’ wages could be expected to have a modest effect on unemployment for 
those to whom the subsidy was offered, but the effect would be offset by some displacement.” 
The commission made no recommendations about wage insurance or supplements; the 
commissioners concluded that there was insufficient evidence available to make a policy 
decision. The commission research director then requested that the Department conduct a wage 
subsidy experiment to provide future policy guidance.  However, because of lack of will and lack 
of funding, no experiment was ever conducted. 
In 2002, the Bush administration negotiated with Congress to establish a small, new wage 
supplement demonstration program, called the Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance (ATAA) 
program.  The ATAA is a program for some workers permanently separated from their jobs due 
to international trade, if they are eligible for the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program.  It 
is funded from the same source as the entire TAA program, the Federal Unemployment Benefit 
Account (FUBA), which in turn is funded from federal general revenue. ATAA was designed 
through negotiations between congressional and executive branch staff but was not based on 
empirical evidence. The program is available to TAA-certified workers age 50 or older who 
have lost their jobs due to international trade. TAA-certified workers are eligible for ATAA 
wage subsidies if they obtain full-time jobs that pay $50,000 or less, earn less than they did in 
their prior jobs, and find employment within 26 weeks of becoming unemployed. They may 
receive a wage subsidy equal to 50 percent of the difference between their old and new wage for 
up to two years, but they cannot receive more than a total of $10,000.  They cannot receive 
ATAA once they receive TAA-approved training. 
In the 110th Congress beginning in 2007, a number of ambitious federal legislative 
proposals for wage supplementation could have resulted in programs of much larger scope and 
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cost. Some proposals would have made all dislocated workers eligible for wage subsidies; would 
have included earnings-loss replacement rates of 25, 50, or 75 percent; and would have made 
payments for up to six years.  The estimated cost for some of these larger programs ranged from 
about $3 billion to $20 billion per year, whereas in 2006 the ATAA program paid out roughly 
$15 million. Similarly, the ATAA program made payments to about 3,200 new recipients in 
2006, whereas a program available to all dislocated workers might make payments to as many as 
2 million workers (USDOL 2007).  By contrast, the ATAA program began operating in 2003, 
and by 2007 it paid wage insurance/supplements to fewer than 6,800 workers (Montgomery 
2007). 
The experience of implementing a small wage insurance/supplement program in the form 
of the ATAA has generated interest. Rather than limited wage supplements to older workers 
adversely affected by international trade, interest has expanded to all dislocated American 
workers regardless of their age. The proposal in President Obama’s January 2016 State of the 
Union address reflects this broader targeting. 
This paper reviews some current and past proposals that relate to wage 
insurance/supplement policy. It also reviews past calls for demonstration projects and 
recommends a rigorous evaluation of any wage insurance/supplement programs that may emerge 
from reauthorization of the TAA program in the 111th Congress.  It also suggests that a 
comprehensive random assignment demonstration project be conducted to evaluate and assess 
alternative designs for large-scale wage insurance/supplement programs. 
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WAGE INSURANCE/SUPPLEMENT RESEARCH AND POLICY PROPOSALS 
A number of Brookings Institution researchers have been the leading advocates for wage 
insurance or supplementation.  Although the discussion of wage insurance/supplements can be 
found in research literature decades earlier, Brookings researchers initiated a continuing policy 
debate about wage supplements for dislocated workers beginning in the mid-1980s.  Since then, 
advocates of wage insurance/supplement proposals have periodically renewed, refined, and 
adapted their proposals to changing policy concerns. 
Most wage supplement proposals and programs before the mid-1980s targeted low-wage 
workers and aimed to reduce poverty and provide income support. Since then, there have been 
persistent concerns about worker dislocation, particularly about dislocations related to 
international trade. Emphasis has shifted back and forth as to whether the goal of wage 
supplements is to ease the impact of domestic or international worker displacements. Brookings’ 
articles and books published in 1984, 1993, 2006, and 2007 propose wage supplements to 
alleviate the worker dislocation associated with macroeconomic policy to promote economic 
growth. Interspersed among these proposals are other published Brookings proposals from 1986, 
1998, 2006, and 2007 that endorse using wage supplements to ease the adjustment to job loss 
from international trade. The Hamilton Project, a public policy group housed within the 
Brookings Institution, has taken up the issue, encouraging the development of federal legislative 
proposals.  A common problem with the Brookings proposals is that they advocate big policy 
concepts with limited empirical grounding. 
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U.S. Research and Policy Analysis 
The following articles and books are among those that have proposed wage 
insurance/supplement programs.  Most of them were written by Brookings researchers and 
published by the Brookings Institution.  They are reviewed in chronological order and also are 
summarized in Table 1. 
1.  Lawrence, Krause, Meyer, and Cohen (1984): Brookings Institution 
The first Brookings proposal for providing wage supplements to dislocated workers was 
presented in 1984.  Economic Choices (Lawrence et al. 1984) is a book that deals with 
macroeconomic policy to create sustainable growth and competitiveness in world markets. One 
chapter, “Adjusting to Economic Change,” calls for microeconomic policy to reduce the losses 
experienced by adversely affected workers. The authors devote less than a page to call for a 
broad program for dislocated workers “compensating the most severely affected victims of 
structural change” (p. 150).  Thus, this proposal targets all dislocated workers regardless of the 
source of their displacement.  Partial compensation for wage loss was seen as superior to UI 
because it would not have the work disincentive effects of UI, but the authors do not consider 
either the design details of a program or how the program might provide incentives to speed the 
return to work. Wage supplements were considered to provide a strong incentive to work 
because they would be paid based on the decline in hourly wages and would therefore encourage 
workers to work more hours.  The authors do note, however, that the UI program did not (and 
still does not) collect hourly wage rates upon which any supplementation would be based, so a 
substantial change would be required in the UI tax collection system in every state to add hourly 
wages to the current quarterly collection of wage data. 
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2.  Lawrence and Litan (1986): Brookings Institution 
Two years later, Lawrence and Litan proposed another wage supplement program for 
dislocated workers, this one targeted more toward dislocated workers who were adversely 
impacted by international trade. This proposal was part of a book, Saving Free Trade: A 
Pragmatic Approach, aimed at gaining support for a U.S. free trade policy (Lawrence and Litan 
1986). The authors were concerned that record trade deficits encourage domestic industries to 
seek temporary protection from free trade under the escape clause of the Trade Act of 1974. 
They propose methods to reduce the pressure to circumvent free trade policy. For firms and 
workers that are adversely affected by international trade, they propose relief. Affected firms 
would be given relief from antitrust legislation, allowing special provisions for mergers.  
Workers would receive improved Trade Adjustment Assistance benefits. 
Lawrence and Litan propose three types of assistance to affected workers.  They would 1) 
reconfigure trade benefits in the form of “earnings insurance” to encourage rapid adjustment and 
reemployment, 2) provide extended unemployment benefits to trade-impacted unemployed 
workers residing in regions of high unemployment, and 3) provide additional training and 
relocation allowances. Their proposal is for “cost-effective” trade assistance programs that 
would target only those dislocated workers who lost their jobs as part of serious dislocations that 
were primarily due to import competition, be available only temporarily, and be cost-effective in 
the sense of providing subsidies to workers and firms rather than restricting trade. 
The “earnings insurance” component of trade benefits would be available to trade-
affected workers after they become reemployed, and these benefits would replace UI benefits. 
This earnings insurance proposal does not provide details with respect to program design or 
administration.  The authors suggest a 50 percent wage replacement rate, but they do not provide 
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detailed specifications. For example, they do not provide either the maximum annual payment or 
the maximum payment period. They suggest that the percentage of income replaced could 
decline over time and could also reflect the age and experience of individual workers, increasing 
with age and tenure. 
3.  Baily, Burtless, and Litan (1993): Brookings Institution 
Wage supplements were again proposed in 1993 by Baily, Burtless, and Litan in their 
book, Growth with Equity: Economic Policy-Making for the Next Century (1993).  The authors 
propose to reduce the opposition to economic change, and particularly to change caused by trade 
liberalization, by compensating trade adjustment losers such that their losses will be manageable. 
They also want to encourage workers to rapidly come to terms with the fact that, having 
permanently lost their jobs, they need to adjust quickly. The authors propose to offer an 
incentive to rapid adjustment, eliminating the disincentives of the UI program, and particularly of 
the TAA program, for which benefits can continue for up to 104 weeks.  They expect the change 
in incentives to speed dislocated workers’ return to work, even if those workers take lower 
paying jobs while partially compensating for this loss. 
While the authors concentrate on trade-affected dislocated workers, they also consider the 
possibility of greatly broadening wage supplements to cover all dislocated workers, whether they 
are displaced by international trade or domestic causes. They suggest that to limit its costs, 
eligibility criteria might be considered, perhaps consisting of workers’ long job tenure, location 
in a high unemployment labor market, or being subject to a mass layoff. 
For workers who, after displacement due to trade, take new jobs paying less than their 
prior wage they propose to replace 50 percent of the workers’ wage loss for a period of two 
years. The proposal would be a work incentive only to those dislocated workers who, after 
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receiving the wage supplement offer, may have to take a job paying less than their prior job. 
Upon taking a lower paying job, they would become eligible for such payments. The authors’ 
program design is incomplete, however, failing to address program components such as the 
qualification eligibility period within which a worker must find a job, the maximum payment 
level, whether participants would have to take full-time jobs, and funding. 
The crux of the authors’ argument is that the United States should increase labor market 
equity for those workers adversely affected by trade; in return, the cost to the government of 
providing additional transfer payments would be reduced, in part, by more rapid reemployment 
that would reduce the period of unemployment and increase employment and earnings. 
4.  Burtless, Lawrence, and Litan (1998): Brookings Institution 
In 1998, the same Brookings researchers were again promoting free trade, trying to 
overcome fear of global competition in their book, Globaphobia (Burtless et al. 1998). 
Searching for effective programs to gain support for international trade policy, the authors 
criticized existing policy and identified three flaws in the TAA program. First, they concluded 
that providing cash payments under the Trade Readjustment Assistance (TRA) portion of the 
program delayed workers finding jobs.  Second, they observed that the requirement to enroll in 
training did not increase earnings. Finally, they noted that TRA payments did not compensate 
workers for reductions in earnings. 
In response to these flaws, they proposed that the entire TAA program be replaced with 
an “earnings insurance” program.  The program would be narrowly tailored to respond to 
specific new trade agreements and would be available to all unemployed workers in specified 
affected industries for a limited period of time subject to congressional authorization. In the 
authors’ example, affected workers would receive 50 percent of their earnings loss. While all 
13 
affected workers could be eligible, they suggest that eligibility could be limited based on age—
considered to be reasonable on equity grounds—or minimum job tenure (e.g., two years). 
Although the source of the funding is not identified, benefits would be capped at $10,000 per 
year. Workers could only receive benefits for up to two years after their displacement. This 
means that the maximum period of recipiency would be two years, but delaying reemployment 
would reduce the amount of potential entitlement. It is this declining entitlement that they 
believed would act as an incentive to search for work and promptly accept a new job. The 
authors suggest that if this trade-related program were successful, it could be expanded to cover a 
broader class of displaced workers (Burtless, Lawrence, and Litan 1998). 
This proposal to provide ”earnings insurance” to all dislocated workers also was more 
administratively practical than the Lawrence et al. (1984) proposal by proposing to pay wage 
supplements on a monthly or quarterly basis. Thus, it might be possible to use quarterly UI wage 
records as the basis for payments rather than to require nearly every state in the country to 
change their UI wage records systems to add hourly wages (Burtless et al. 1998). 
5.  Kletzer and Litan (2001): Brookings Institution 
In 2001, Kletzer and Litan published “A Prescription for Worker Anxiety,” which 
suggests the need for wage supplements both for domestic and international economic purposes.  
They seek to retain support for flexible labor markets and free trade and suggest that wage 
supplements would be a better safety net than the TAA program. The authors would retain the 
current UI program but suggest replacing the TAA program with a wage insurance/supplement 
program available to all dislocated workers (as well as subsidies for medical insurance for all 
dislocated workers for up to six months while they are unemployed) when they become 
reemployed. Wage supplements would replace 50 percent of lost wages up to an annual 
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maximum of $10,000. They would be time limited, available for only two years after the initial 
job loss, encouraging rapid reemployment, since each additional week of unemployment would 
reduce the wage supplement entitlement by a week.  The 50 percent replacement rate might vary 
with the age and tenure of the workers.  Kletzer and Litan estimate that such a program would 
have cost $3.0 billion in 1999 and $2.3 billion in 1997 when the unemployment rate was lower. 
The year after the publication of Kletzer and Litan’s paper, a small, targeted wage 
supplement program (ATAA) was enacted as part of the 2002 TAA reauthorization bill. 
6.  Brainard, Litan, and Warren (2006): Brookings Institution 
In “A Fairer Deal for America’s Workers in an Era of Offshoring,” Brainard, Litan, and 
Warren (2006) propose wage supplements to address an emerging international trade issue—
offshore outsourcing. The main objectives of this version of wage supplements are to speed 
reemployment, act as an on-the-job training subsidy for employers, and encourage workers to try 
new types of jobs in stronger sectors of the economy. 
Despite their concern about the loss of jobs through foreign trade, and more specifically 
from offshore outsourcing, the authors recommend that wage supplements be targeted to all 
dislocated workers, regardless of the source of their dislocation.  Workers would be eligible if 
they were displaced from full-time jobs and accept new full-time employment. Wage 
supplements would pay one-half of lost wages up to a maximum of $10,000 per year for up to 
two years. The benefits would only be available for two years after workers find a job or for 26 
weeks after becoming reemployed, depending on which comes sooner. The authors expect this 
design to encourage workers to return to work quickly and to limit the subsidy to the early period 
of employment during which most on-the-job training is provided. 
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They estimate and compare the cost of their wage supplement program to other programs. 
They estimate the cost at $20,000 per worker, about the same as the ATAA wage supplement 
program ($19,350), but considerably less than the TAA program ($32,700). On other hand, it 
would cost more per person than the combination of UI payments and providing Workforce 
Investment Act program services, and much more than George W. Bush administration proposals 
for Personal Reemployment Accounts or Career Advancement Accounts.  Brainard, Litan, and 
Warren estimate the total cost of the wage supplement programs using alternative designs for the 
years 2000–2004. Their basic proposal of a program that replaces 50 percent of lost income for 
up to two years, with a cap of $10,000 per year, would have cost a low of $2.6 billion in 2000 
and a high of $5.1 billion in 2002, varying with economic conditions. 
7.  Rosen and Kletzer (2006): The Hamilton Project 
The Hamilton Project began in 2006 as a public policy effort within the Brookings 
Institution under the leadership of Robert Rubin, Gene Sperling, and others. The Project has 
considered a wide variety of federal policy issues, including those dealing with the revision of 
current income transfer programs.  One of the Hamilton Project’s founding principles is that there 
is no incompatibility between economic security and economic growth, so the Project has been 
searching for new ideas to improve economic security. Two early Hamilton Project papers 
propose wage supplementation. 
In “Reforming Unemployment Insurance for the Twenty-First Century Workforce,” 
Rosen and Kletzer (2006) propose modest reform of the UI program but also include a wage 
supplement proposal as an addition to, not a substitute for, unemployment insurance. Their wage 
supplement program would target all dislocated workers, regardless of the source of their 
displacement. Their proposal is not specific—it simply suggests that eligible workers receive a 
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fraction of their wage loss, and that the fraction replaced might depend on factors such as age and 
employment tenure. They do, however, refer to the more specific proposal discussed above by 
Brainard et al. (2006). 
8.  Kling (2006): The Hamilton Project 
In “Fundamental Restructuring of Unemployment Insurance: Wage-Loss Insurance and 
Temporary Earnings Replacement Accounts,” Kling (2006) proposes a more radical approach. 
He would eliminate the current UI program altogether, while retaining the basic UI tax system. 
UI would be replaced with a private savings plan, similar to the previously proposed “UI savings 
accounts” (Feldstein and Altman 1998). Unemployed workers could make withdrawals from 
government-administered individual unemployment savings accounts (Kling calls them 
temporary earnings replacement accounts, or TERAs). Withdrawals would be governed by rules 
similar to the current UI eligibility and benefit payment rules. One-third of the continuing UI tax 
would be used to supplement TERA withdrawals for workers who do not have enough funds in 
their TERAs for withdrawals either because they experience low earnings or do not go back to 
work.  Loan repayment of the TERAs would be made through employer-administered payroll 
deductions as a percent of future earnings. 
Kling would use the other two-thirds of the UI tax to pay “wage-loss insurance,” his name 
for wage supplements.  Workers permanently separated from an employer would be eligible for 
wage supplements if they had worked for one year or more for their former employers and met 
all of the eligibility requirements for UI benefit receipt.  Unemployed workers, however, would 
be eligible for wage supplement payments even if they went directly to work for another 
employer and did not make withdrawals from their TERA accounts.  In UI terminology, they 
could have “never filed” for benefits and still be eligible for wage insurance payments.  Workers 
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would receive one-quarter of the difference between their prior hourly wages and their current 
hourly wages, although wage-loss compensation would be constrained by limiting the 
computational prior wage to no more than $15 per hour. Workers would be eligible to receive 
wage insurance for up to six years. Kling’s proposal is estimated to cost approximately $20 
billion per year when fully operational. 
Kling’s proposal is designed to be revenue neutral to the federal budget when compared 
to the current UI program.  Funding his wage insurance proposal could only be accomplished by 
privatizing the UI program—he would shift unemployment wage-loss payments from a 
government-sponsored social insurance program to a worker-funded private saving program. 
This shift would allow the redirection of most of the continuing UI tax revenue to fully fund a 
new wage insurance program. The proposal’s goal is to substantially shift income support 
programs from insuring short-term earnings losses during unemployment to long-term earnings 
losses after workers become reemployed. 
In “Strengthening Unemployment Insurance: A Critique of Individual Accounts and 
Wage Loss Insurance,” Wayne Vroman (2007) critiques the Kling proposal. Among other 
things, he questions the policy priority of establishing a wage supplement compared to 1) making 
policy improvements to the UI program itself; and 2) other forms of support for dislocated 
workers, including job matching, provision of labor market information, relocation allowances, 
and training and education. He also advocates the need for conducting a random assignment 
experiment to evaluate the behavioral responses to wage supplement interventions. Such an 
experiment could also be used to compare the effectiveness and efficiency of wage supplements 
to alternative financial incentives (e.g., reemployment bonuses) and reemployment services. 
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9.  LaLonde (2007) 
In “The Case for Wage Insurance,” LaLonde (2007) makes the case for using wage 
supplements as a tool to increase support for international trade for the Council on Foreign 
Relations.  The policy goal of this proposal is to reduce opposition to free trade at a time of great 
fear of the adverse impact of international trade on American jobs.  Although he acknowledges 
that wage supplements cannot assure trade liberalization, he believes they can help. 
LaLonde, points out that the greatest cost of worker dislocation to long-tenured, middle-
income workers is the wage loss after reemployment, rather than wage loss during 
unemployment. He also believes that wage supplements are desirable regardless of their positive 
impact on public acceptance of free trade because the failure to provide this type of catastrophic 
insurance represents a market failure in the U.S. economy. 
Starting from a “consensus” wage supplement proposal model that targets all dislocated 
workers, provides them 50 percent replacement of lost wages for up to two years, caps 
supplements at $10,000 per year, and restricts supplements to workers earning up to $50,000 per 
year, LaLonde nonetheless believes that this model is inadequate.  He questions a number of 
these parameters as being inadequate to helping middle-income workers suffering the largest 
wage loss from displacement, but he does not suggest alternatives other than recommending 
increasing the maximum duration of receipt from two to four years.  LaLonde also recommends 
limiting eligibility to long-tenured dislocated workers, defining them as workers employed for 12 
or more quarters with their primary predisplacement employer. 
Although LaLonde’s goal is to increase support for free trade policy, he does not target 
his proposal only to dislocated workers adversely affected by international trade. He would 
provide benefits to all dislocated workers to reduce the fear of international trade, a fear that 
19 
American workers may harbor regardless of whether they eventually lose their jobs due to 
domestic or international factors. 
LaLonde suggests that the resulting program would cost about twice the estimated $2–$3 
billion per year of the traditional program design, apparently following the Kletzer and Litan 
(2001) estimates. He suggests four potential methods to fully finance the program: 1) imposing a 
tax or “insurance premium” of $2–$3 per month; 2) imposing a deductible, restricting wage 
supplement payments to workers with earnings losses of greater than 5 percent; 3) diverting 
dislocated worker program funding from less cost-effective training programs; or 4) extending 
the UI waiting period by two weeks. 
10.  Burtless (2007) 
In “Income Supports for Workers and Their Families,” Burtless (2007) reverses field 
from his 1998 Globaphobia book with respect to the scope of wage supplements. He presents 
arguments for providing wage supplements (“time-limited earnings insurance”) to all dislocated 
workers, whether they are impacted by international trade or not, in large part to deal with the 
trend toward increasing durations of unemployment. He also proposes what has become the 
“consensus” wage supplement model, which would be targeted to dislocated workers with 
minimum tenure (two or three years) with their prior employer.  The wage supplement would 
replace 50 percent of the earnings reduction of workers, capped at $10,000 per year and available 
for up to 18 months or two years. 
Burtless’s proposal also addresses a number of behavioral and other issues. Wage 
supplements would be time limited, with eligibility ending 18 or 24 months after layoff, 
encouraging workers to take new jobs rapidly.  He offers the option of restricting supplements to 
workers who find full-time jobs or reduce payments to part-time workers. On equity grounds, he 
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suggests increasing the wage replacement rate for older workers or workers with longer job 
tenure. 
Burtless also discusses the limitations of wage supplements. Supplements would help, 
but not solve, the problem of increasing durations of spells of unemployment, and they would 
help workers with middle and upper earnings, but not low-wage workers.  Something else would 
have to be done to help the poor. 
Summary of the Brookings Institution Approach to Wage Supplements 
The Brookings Institution researchers involved in the wage supplement debate are all 
economists who have looked at how U.S. government policy and programs have dealt with both 
dislocated workers in general and dislocated workers adversely affected by international trade in 
particular. The main players over the years also have divided between international trade 
specialists (e.g., Lawrence and Litan 1986) and labor economists (e.g., Burtless and Baily). 
Their economic specialties have tended to shape the policy concerns between international trade 
and domestic labor force policy (Burtless 2008). 
The Brookings economists share common concerns. They believe that some current 
employment and training programs have not been effective, particularly those that provide short- 
term training. If those programs result in no net benefits, the researchers reason that substituting 
wage supplements for less effective programs would yield positive results for recipients. 
All of the Brookings economists’ proposals, with the exception of Kling (2006), have 
supported the UI program.  Their proposals have treated wage supplements as a substitute for 
ineffective reemployment services rather than as a substitute for UI. Burtless, however, goes 
further and suggests that, although the basic UI program should be preserved and strengthened, 
wage supplements are a better investment than providing additional weeks of benefits to trade-
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affected unemployed workers.  An argument for substituting wage supplements for UI benefits is 
that the latter provides some disincentive to work while the former does not. Although the 
modest wage replacement rates and duration of proposed wage supplements, as well as narrow 
targeting, make such a proposal unlikely to significantly raise support for international trade, 
Burtless notes that countries that are more open to international trade have stronger social safety 
nets, and he argues that wage supplements could be an important additional component of the 
American safety net (Burtless 2008). 
Canada Tests Wage Supplements: The Earnings Supplement Project (ESP) Experiment 
In 1995 and 1996, the Canadian government ran a type of wage supplement 
demonstration called the Earnings Supplement Project (ESP) experiment. Canada had been 
exploring approaches to provide reemployment incentives to dislocated workers, looking at both 
reemployment bonus experiments and the concept of wage supplements in the United States.  In 
the end, Canada tested a wage insurance program based on the Brookings models but called an 
“earnings supplement.”  This different title was not an idle change; the Canadians did not need 
to sell this concept as “insurance,” and they were willing to make the supplements much more 
generous, reflecting greater concern about equity. 
Like most of the Brookings proposals, the Canadian approach was designed to both speed 
the adjustment of dislocated workers—encouraging them to take lower paying jobs if 
necessary—and partially compensate these dislocated workers for their lost income when they 
took these jobs.  The target group was all dislocated workers, not just those adversely affected by 
trade policy.  Treatment group members were offered generous payments of 75 percent of their 
earnings loss for up to two years. They received a payment only if they suffered an earnings loss 
and became employed in a nearly full-time job (32 hours per week) within 26 weeks of the offer 
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date.  To receive benefits, the new job had to be in employment covered by the UI program. It 
also had to be with a new employer or in a job with the previous employer at a new location. 
Benefits were capped at C$250 per week, allowing benefits of up to C$13,000 per year (Bloom 
et al. 1999). 
Out of a sample of 5,912 dislocated workers—split equally between the treatment and 
control group—20 percent of the treatment group drew an earnings supplement within the six-
month job-search/qualification period. The average payment for supplement recipients was 
C$8,705, and the average weekly supplement payment was C$127. The median number of 
weeks for which supplements were paid was 73 weeks and the mean was 64 weeks.  Fifteen 
percent received less than 27 weeks, and 41 percent received more than 78 payments (Bloom et 
al. 1999). 
The net impacts of the experiment did not support the concept of wage supplements 
increasing labor market efficiency. The treatment group was more likely than the control group 
to take both a full-time job and a low-wage job. The experiment, however, did not reduce UI 
costs or lead to greater earnings. The impacts on weeks of unemployment benefits received and 
annual earnings were actually of the wrong sign, although they were not significant. Indeed, 
average annual weeks of unemployment benefits increased by 0.2 weeks, and average annual 
earnings decreased by C$546 (Bloom et al. 1999). 
The Canadian ESP experiment did not fulfill the expectations of the wage insurance 
proposal in the sense that ESP participants did not accelerate their return to work. They did not 
reduce their UI benefit durations, and they did not increase their earnings. The evaluators of ESP 
(Bloom et al. 1999) summarize their findings: 
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The overall effect of ESP was quite small . . . Two out of ten displaced workers 
who were offered the supplement program actually received supplement 
payments.  The effect of the program was a small increase in early full-time 
employment, with a small countervailing reduction in wages, and no decrease in 
unemployment benefits. The net financial benefits of the supplement were 
modestly positive for displaced workers overall, although it was a major source of 
temporary income for a small fraction who received supplement payments.  
Furthermore, the supplement was a net cost to the Canadian government. 
 
In summary . . . ESP suggest(s) that even a generous re-employment incentive 
will not make a big difference for large numbers of displaced workers . . . this 
approach has to date neither markedly improved labour market outcomes nor 
substantially reduced unemployment benefits . . . 
 
Kling (2006, p. 17) recognizes this problem: “Some observers have viewed the [ESP] 
program as a failure because UI expenditures were not reduced appreciably; the primary goal of 
the program was to accelerate reemployment and reduce traditional UI expenditures. . . . The 
primary motivation of the proposal in this paper, however, is not to reduce government 
payments.” Most other Brookings researchers, however, have expected wage supplements to 
accelerate the return to work and reduce UI expenditures. 
The ESP experiment, however, is not a fair test of wage insurance in the United States. 
The replacement rate of 75 percent was greater than the rates currently being proposed here. The 
job- search/qualification period of 26 weeks to find a job was longer than one would set in the 
United States if a program targeting all dislocated workers were designed to reduce the duration 
of UI receipt because the total potential entitlement to United States UI regular benefits is only 26 
weeks.  The insured unemployment duration, thus, could only be reduced if the qualification 
period were set well below the maximum UI duration. 
Reemployment Bonuses 
The reemployment bonus research, discussed above, is relevant to the discussion of wage 
supplements.  In all of the reemployment bonus experiments, the design required that dislocated 
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workers find jobs within 12 weeks or less, and the bonus offer amount was modest. When 
implemented, the project design had to reduce the duration of unemployment to permit the 
possibility of cost-effective outcomes.  To be cost-effective to the government sector, the total 
cost of reemployment bonuses (bonus amount and administrative cost) had to be less than the 
total benefits (reductions in UI benefit payments and increases in tax payments during longer 
periods of work).  By contrast, the Canadian ESP design was so generous that it could not be 
cost-effective. 
A wage supplement program offered to all dislocated workers in the United States would 
have to have a shorter qualification period than that of the Earnings Supplement Project—about 
12 weeks—if it were to speed the workers’ return to work. Similarly, a program that offers much 
larger payment amounts would not be cost-effective to the government.  Much more generous 
programs could likely be designed to compensate for wage loss, but they would have to be 
evaluated as to whether they would have positive behavioral impacts on the return to work. 
Regardless of their behavioral effect, they likely would not be cost-effective to the government. 
WAGE SUPPLEMENTS IN OPERATION: THE ALTERNATIVE TRADE 
ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE (ATAA) PROGRAM 
Wage Supplements under the 2002 Reauthorization of the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
Program 
The TAA Act authorizes benefits and provides training to workers who are determined to 
be adversely affected by international trade. It is a small program relative to the number of 
workers who are dislocated each year; fewer than 100,000 workers begin receiving income 
support each year (see Table 2), compared to 2–3 million workers who are dislocated each year.  
These newly certified workers make up only a small percentage of the 7–10 million workers who 
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receive UI benefits each year. The Trade Readjustment Allowances (TRA) program is 
administered by the state UI programs, while the non-TRA portion of the TAA program is 
administered separately by the state workforce agency. 
If they believe that the workers qualify for the program, the workers or their 
representatives in individual firms file petitions on behalf of the workers.  The petitions are 
investigated and reviewed by federal staff, and the workers are determined to be trade impacted 
or not. Between 1,000 and 3,000 petitions are filed each year, and approximately 60 percent are 
certified under the TAA program.  Although 100,000–200,000 workers are certified to receive 
benefits each year, only half or fewer eventually receive income support.  A smaller proportion—
one-third or fewer—actually receive training each year, in part because of limited funding. 
At the beginning of 2002, White House policymakers began to consider the terms for 
reauthorization of the TAA program.  A proposal for Structural Adjustment Accounts (SAA) was 
developed to use private market incentives to encourage displaced workers to find jobs quickly. 
The Bush administration thought that existing TAA and WIA Dislocated Worker programs gave 
workers training they did not need, which delayed reemployment. In response, SAAs were 
proposed to alter the incentives. The accounts were considered to be applicable to all workers 
who were permanently separated from industries with declining employment, whether or not 
international trade was the source of this displacement.  SAAs could be used to pay for training, 
relocation, or income maintenance, and they would be offered in addition to regular UI. 
However, since SAAs would be expensive, if offered in the amount of a $5,000 voucher, they 
were proposed as a replacement for the current TAA program.  When expanded and offered to all 
dislocated workers, they also would replace the WIA Dislocated Worker program.  Initially the 
SAAs were proposed to be made available only to TAA-eligible workers under the upcoming 
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reauthorization of the TAA program, and could be offered either on a large scale or as a small- 
scale social science experiment (Council of Economic Advisers 2002). 
In the spring of 2002, the author developed a proposal for the Department of Labor to test 
the wage supplement concept as a social science experiment using random assignment. The 
experimental design followed the Council of Economic Advisers’ small-scale experiment 
approach. For the demonstration, approximately 10,000 TAA beneficiaries were proposed to be 
assigned to the treatment and control groups. The wage supplement would have been paid for up 
to two years to TAA-eligible workers who were 50 years of age or older. Treatment group 
members would have been offered payments of up to half the difference between their prior 
wage and their current wage, up to a maximum of $10,000 over two years, but only if they took a 
job within six months of their layoff. There were no earnings levels restrictions for the new job. 
The demonstration was estimated to cost $27.8 million, and the initiative would have been 
authorized under the new TAA program (Wandner 2002). 
In the negotiations between the Bush administration and Congress during the summer of 
2002, the wage supplement demonstration project was dropped. The Senate Finance Committee 
under Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) was developing its own TAA bill. The committee hired 
labor economist Howard Rosen as a consultant to work on developing the bill. Rosen specializes 
in international and labor market adjustment issues and had been an advocate of the TAA 
program. He was first introduced to wage supplement proposals by Lori Kletzer, who had 
conducted research in this area. Rosen wrote a trade bill for the committee that included a wage 
supplement section. He was opposed to having the Department of Labor run a wage supplement 
experiment because he knew that the planned 1988 experiment had never been completed, and he 
did not believe that the Department would be able to conduct a new experiment. Based on his 
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formulation, the Senate passed its TAA bill before the House considered the measure. Senator 
Baucus then met with Rep. William Thomas (R-CA), chair of the Ways and Means Committee. 
He convinced Thomas that a wage supplement was a sound proposal. Thomas championed the 
provision and gave it its name, Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance (Rosen 2008). 
Thus, the Bush wage supplement experiment was replaced with an expanded entitlement 
program that was available to the same eligible workers and payable under the same terms and 
conditions, except for a ATAA restriction that the new job could not pay more than $50,000 per 
year. This program is funded from federal general revenue. The legislative heading for the 
ATAA provision still reflects that it was designed as a demonstration program—Section 124 of 
TAA is still titled “Demonstration Project for Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance for Older 
Workers,” even though it was enacted as an entitlement program available to all eligible TAA 
recipients in all states. 
The ATAA is a limited wage supplement program for a small subset of trade-impacted 
workers. The design was clearly informed by the policy discussion of the preceding two decades.  
It follows aspects of the Brookings models in that it replaces 50 percent of the wage loss of the 
new job relative to the old job, is available for two years, and provides annual payments not to 
exceed $10,000 to workers who obtain full-time jobs. 
However, some of the design components differ from the Brookings’ models. ATAA is 
limited to TAA-certified workers who are age 50 or older. ATAA also is limited to workers who 
receive new earnings of $50,000 or less per year. There is no time limit for drawing wage 
supplements. Workers who find employment within 26 weeks of becoming unemployed can 
draw benefits for up to two years.  Workers cannot receive ATAAs if they receive TAA-
approved training. 
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The age limitation is a way of favoring older workers.  It excludes younger workers 
altogether and provides older workers with greater benefits. The requirement that workers find a 
job within 26 weeks likely provides a weaker incentive to return to work than a time-limited 
program.  This 26-week requirement also is approximately twice as generous as the qualification 
period for reemployment bonuses, so it is likely to provide far less of an incentive to return to 
work quickly. 
While the ATAA program was enacted as part of TAA reauthorization in 2002, the 
Department of Labor did not immediately develop program specifications and provide guidance 
to state employment security agencies. Guidance to the states was provided in 2003, and states 
implemented the program in 2003 and 2004.  Because the states could administer the program for 
five years after initial implementation, the state programs did not lapse until 2008 and 2009 
(Clark 2008). 
Thus, the ATAA program has been small and slow to start. Once operational in all states 
operating TAA programs, it served between 2,000 and 4,000 workers in FY 2005–2007, 
representing less than 3 percent of certified workers and less than 6 percent of TAA program 
participants who receive income support. ATAA outlays during FY 2005 and 2006 were 
approximately $50 million, less than 10 percent of outlays on TAA income support (See Table 
3). 
Little is known about the operation or impacts of the ATAA program.  The Department 
of Labor funded an evaluation of the TAA program as reauthorized in 2002, but the evaluation 
dealt only indirectly with ATAA.  The evaluators found that the ATAA program is either 
administered solely by state UI programs or cooperatively with non-TRA state agencies that 
provide training and reemployment services.  Early administrative problems in setting up the 
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ATAA program have eased substantially. The take-up rates for ATAA-eligible workers, 
however, have been very low. In late 2005, the evaluator estimated the average take-up rate at 
between 4 and 5 percent, but for individual states the take-up rates ranged from 0 to 10 percent. 
The reason for the low take-up rate was not determined, but possible explanations appeared to be 
that 1) workers did not know about the program, 2) workers might have mistakenly thought that 
TAA is only a training program, 3) workers could not find a job within 26 weeks, or 4) workers 
did not want to forgo training that is accompanied by generous TRA payments (Social Policy 
Research Associates 2007). 
WAGE SUPPLEMENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE 110TH CONGRESS 
When the newly Democratic-controlled 110th Congress began its first session in January 
2007, it quickly began consideration of a number of bills that would expand then current ATAA 
program as part of the TAA reauthorization. One bill, proposed by Senators Max Baucus (D-
MT) and Norm Coleman (R-MN), would have lowered the minimum age of eligibility for ATAA 
from 50 to 40.  Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Rep. Jim McDermott (D-WA) developed a 
bill that looked more like the Brainard (2006) proposal in that almost all dislocated workers of 
any age would be eligible.  An early newspaper article indicated that dislocated workers might be 
eligible if they earned less than $97,500 per year, and benefits might be as high as $20,000 per 
year (Montgomery 2007). Other senators were said to support only much more modest 
expansions of ATAA that were tied to international trade. 
On the international trade side, the impetus for congressional action was the fact that the 
2002 TAA program was authorized for only five years, and it expired in September 2007.  Since 
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ATAA was only a small program in the TAA programs, the issue became whether to continue 
ATAA unchanged or expand it, and, if it were to be expanded, by how much. 
Wage Supplements for All Dislocated Workers 
Interest in wage supplement proposals increased with the start of a new Democratic 
Congress in early 2007. The House Ways and Means Committee held a hearing on wage 
insurance in February 2007. The hearing was called by Rep. James McDermott, chair of the 
Subcommittee on Income Security and Family Support, the subcommittee that has jurisdiction 
over the UI and TAA programs. The key witness at the hearing was Lael Brainard of the 
Brookings Institution. 
Brainard testified again before the Joint Economic Committee on February 28, 2007. Her 
wage supplement proposal was based on proposals in Kletzer and Litan (2001) as well as her 
own 2006 paper.  She advocated making wage supplements available to all dislocated workers 
unemployed for any reason, whether or not they lost their jobs because of international trade. 
Unemployed workers would be eligible if they were permanently separated from full-time jobs 
and had at least two years of tenure at their previous jobs.  They would be eligible to receive 
weekly payments of half of the difference between their prior and current wages, up to a 
maximum of $10,000 per year.  They could receive these payments for up to two years.  Brainard 
estimated the cost of her proposal at $3.5 billion per year. It would be paid for by an added tax 
of $25 per year on every worker.  The tax would be paid in equal amount by workers and 
employers and would be collected along with the current federal unemployment tax (FUTA) that 
pays for UI administration, UI extended benefits, and the provision of loans to state UI trust fund 
accounts. 
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On March 15, 2007, the Subcommittee on Income Security and Family Support of the 
House Ways and Means Committee held a follow-up hearing on a wage insurance bill (The 
Worker Empowerment Act) that the subcommittee chair, Rep. McDermott, proposed to 
introduce. The bill would have paid wage insurance to workers with two years of tenure who 
permanently lost their jobs through no fault of their own. Half of the lost wages would be 
replaced, up to $10,000 per year for two years, as long as earnings were $100,000 or less. (Low-
wage workers earning less than half the median wage would receive replacements calculated at 
somewhat greater rates.) The program would be financed by a new federal payroll tax paid into 
a new Wage Insurance Trust Fund. The tax paid would be at the rate of 0.1 percent on a tax base 
equal to the Social Security wage base.  The proposed program was estimated to cost $40 per 
year for each covered worker.  With 135 million covered workers in the second quarter of 2008, 
the program would generate revenue of over $5 billion per year. 
This proposal would have enormously expanded wage insurance compared to the current 
ATAA program. It would have doubled the amount of wage supplementation each year to 
$10,000 per year for each of two years. It also would have doubled the maximum annual 
earnings for which supplements would be paid up to $100,000 per year. And, most significantly, 
it would have been payable to all workers who permanently lose their jobs through no fault of 
their own. The sponsors estimated that the legislation would have provided wage supplements to 
350,000–500,000 dislocated workers per year, depending on economic conditions. 
On May 8, 2007, the Worker Empowerment Act of 2007 was introduced in the House of 
Representatives as H.R. 2202 by Rep. Jim McDermott and as S. 1330 in the Senate by Senator 
Charles Schumer (D-NY).   It would have paid “Wage Insurance” of 50 percent of lost wages up 
to a maximum of $10,000 per year. No maximum annual earnings were set above which 
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individuals would not receive wage supplements, but the replacement rate would have declined 
for workers earning more than the Social Security wage base.  Wage insurance would have been 
paid for by employers at a tax rate of 0.06 percent of employee wages up to the Social Security 
wage base, and the funds generated would have been deposited in a Wage Insurance Trust Fund. 
Neither bill had any cosponsors. There was no further action on these bills in the 110th Congress. 
Wage Supplements for Trade Impacted Workers 
On October 22, 2007, Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY) introduced H.R. 3920, the Trade and 
Globalization Assistance Act.  This legislation would have reauthorized and expanded the TAA 
programs. The legislation also would have reauthorized and expanded the wage supplement 
program, which would have been renamed the Reemployment Trade Adjustment Assistance 
program. Many more people would have been potentially eligible for the program because of the 
expanded eligibility. Service workers would have become eligible for TAA for the first time, 
more manufacturing workers would have been eligible—as workers adversely affected by 
offshore outsourcing could draw benefits even if imports did not increase—and there could have 
been industry-wide worker certifications. 
The wage supplement provisions were greatly liberalized in the Rangel bill as well. 
Under that bill, workers could elect to receive wage supplements and not be subject to group 
certification. The qualification period was extended as the requirement that workers find jobs 
within 26 weeks of being laid off would have been eliminated.  Participants could have received 
training and received wage supplements as well. Participants had to be working full time, but if 
they were in training at the same time that they were collecting wage supplements, they would 
have to be working at least 20 hours a week. Workers could have drawn up to $12,000 in wage 
insurance benefits during a two-year eligibility period. Workers would still have to have been 50 
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years old or older to qualify for benefits, but they could have earned up to $60,000 per year after 
reemployment. 
On the Senate side, Senator Max Baucus introduced S.1848 on October 22, 2007.  The 
bill had the same name and similar provisions.  The name of the wage supplement provisions, 
however, was changed to “Wage Insurance,” and the eligibility provisions were changed to allow 
workers 40 years of age or older to collect wage supplements. 
The Trade Adjustment Assistance Act, however, was not reauthorized in the 110th 
Congress. 
WAGE SUPPLEMENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND EVALUATIONS 
From the beginning of the policy initiatives supporting wage supplement in the mid-
1980s, researchers and policymakers recognized that this new approach should be tested by 
implementing demonstration projects that would determine how they would work in the United 
States and what the behavioral response of workers would be to the offer of wage supplements. 
The demonstrations would be rigorously evaluated, requiring that they would be implemented as 
random assignment experiments. A series of such demonstrations have been recommended or 
mandated by law.  None has been implemented. 
Proposed Wage Supplement Experiment under the Trade Act of 1988 
In 1988, TAA was amended to place greater emphasis on reemployment efforts and make 
receipt of trade benefits more restrictive.  Participation in training became an entitlement under 
the trade program, and training participation was mandated. Participation in reemployment 
services was generally encouraged. 
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As part of the 1988 legislation (Public Law 100-418), Section 246, “Supplemental Wage 
Allowance Demonstration Projects,” mandated that the Department of Labor conduct a wage 
supplement demonstration. The target population for the demonstration was dislocated workers 
receiving Trade Readjustment Assistance (TRA) benefits. Trade recipients who obtained a job 
paying less than 80 percent of their prior wages would be eligible to receive a supplement that 
brought them up to the 80 percent level. TRA recipients needed to work nearly full time—32 
hours per week—to receive the supplement. They could receive a supplement for up to one year, 
but the supplement would not begin until workers began collecting TRA benefits, after receipt of 
six months of regular UI benefits. The legislation and the resulting wage supplement proposal 
were not nearly as generous as the Canadian ESP project. 
A design for this wage supplement demonstration was developed by the Department of 
Labor (Corson and Haimson 1995), which contacted the states with the largest TAA workloads 
and requested their participation.  Ultimately, the demonstration was never implemented. The 
key states that had enough trade program recipients to run an experiment—Ohio and 
Pennsylvania—were unwilling to participate. They did not see how an experiment that raised 
some of their state residents up to only 80 percent of their prior wages could benefit either the 
workers or the states. After much negotiation and delays, the implementation of the experiment 
became moot after the enactment of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation program in 
1991 made it impossible to test a wage supplement program during a recessionary extension of 
UI. 
The terms of the 1988 wage supplement demonstration were determined by legislators 
rather than social scientists. It was not clear to researchers why the 80 percent threshold was set, 
why the goal of bringing workers up to no more than a 20 percent loss was an optimal goal, or 
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why the duration of the wage supplement was one year. The researchers would have preferred to 
be given the ability to test a number of different designs to determine which was the most 
effective and efficient. The states that the Department of Labor asked to participate also 
questioned the design, but their concern was that the design was not generous enough, and they 
saw no reason to have TAA recipients in their states offered such restricted wage supplements. 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation Proposal 
As noted above, the members of the Advisory Commission on Unemployment 
Compensation (ACUC, 1995) determined that there was insufficient evidence to develop policy 
recommendations on wage supplements and that any recommendations would have to be 
grounded on experimental evaluations.  Since no rigorous evaluations were available, the ACUC 
members concluded that policy recommendations should await such analysis. The research 
director of the ACUC recommended to the author and to others that the Department of Labor 
conduct a wage supplement experiment. 
Because of the ongoing interest in wage supplements as a policy option, discussions have 
taken place for many years among researchers and policymakers about conducting a wage 
supplement demonstration, but no such demonstration has ever been conducted. 
Proposed Wage Supplement Experiment in 2006 
Most recently, in 2006, the Department of Labor’s Employment and Training 
Administration staff considered testing a broad wage supplement program using a random 
assignment experiment. Under the proposed design of the experiment, wage supplements would 
have been available to all UI claimants who had suffered a permanent job loss, were employed a 
minimum of three years, and were monetarily eligible for UI. Prior to unemployment, eligible 
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claimants would have had annual wages or salaries of between $35,000 and $85,000 per year. If 
they found a job within 26 weeks of becoming unemployed, they would be eligible for wage-loss 
payments of up to 50 percent of their earnings loss over a two-year period. They could receive 
up to $5,000 per year for two years, so total wage supplement payments could reach a total of no 
more than $10,000. 
The proposed experiment would have been available to all dislocated workers, regardless 
of the reason for unemployment. Thus, unlike ATAA, there would be no connection to layoffs 
related to international trade (Office of Policy Development and Research 2006). This proposal 
was considered, but it was not implemented. 
WAGE SUPPLEMENT EVALUATION PROPOSALS 
The efficacy of wage supplements should be evaluated, whether they are targeted to all 
dislocated workers or only to those impacted by international trade. Large-scale wage 
supplement programs are expensive. To avoid unnecessary waste of public funds, empirical 
research should be undertaken to determine whether they are effective and efficient, and, if so, 
what the optimal design might be. 
The key work that needs to be done to develop federal policy regarding wage 
supplements is the launching of a random assignment demonstration project. This demonstration 
project should also include alternative treatments to be able to compare the outcomes of wage 
supplements to other interventions. Other options that could be tested include job search 
assistance, in-depth training and education, and reemployment bonuses, some of which might be 
much less expensive and more cost-effective. For example, a reemployment bonus offered to 
profile dislocated workers would likely cost approximately one-tenth as much as wage 
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supplements of the sort advocated in the Worker Empowerment Act proposal.  Such a large-scale 
demonstration project should be conducted regardless of what other policy or legislative 
initiatives are also pursued. 
Future reauthorizations of the TAA program are likely to retain a wage supplement 
component. A new wage supplement program could be larger and more expensive if it were to 
expand the ATAA program.  It is particularly important to include an evaluation component in 
any new wage supplement program, since the ATAA program has not been evaluated. This 
evaluation should include a quasi-experimental analysis of participants in the new ATAA 
program. It also should include a random assignment demonstration to evaluate the impact of 
further extending the new ATAA program to individuals who are not currently eligible for the 
program. 
Experimental Evaluation of Wage Supplements for All Dislocated Workers 
A random assignment demonstration project would evaluate the potential impacts of 
wage supplement programs that would be available to all dislocated workers. The demonstration 
would be conducted in a small number of states.  Individuals would be selected into treatment 
and control groups from the entire population of dislocated workers who apply for 
unemployment insurance benefits. Selecting from a large population would allow adequate 
sample sizes.  Because participants generally would be dislocated workers who do not collect 
TAA and would not otherwise be eligible for a wage supplement, conducting the experiment 
should be accomplished without opposition from state agencies or from TAA advocates. Also, 
no one would be denied services. Nonparticipating dislocated workers would have all current 
services available to them, while treatment group members would be offered additional services 
and incentives, including a wage supplement. 
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A number of different wage supplement offers could be tested. These offers might differ 
with respect to the amount and duration of the wage supplement. A short (e.g., 13 weeks) and 
long (e.g., 26 weeks) qualification period could be tested, as could different wage supplement 
amounts.  The treatments would be able to measure differences in the response to each offer. 
Wage supplement treatments tested in this experiment also could be compared to other 
treatments that include in-depth job search assistance, a reemployment bonus, and long-term 
training and education. Comparing the effectiveness of the treatments would allow researchers 
to determine the most cost-effective result. 
For example, it might be worthwhile to compare two reemployment incentive programs, 
measuring the impacts of wage supplement proposals to cheaper reemployment bonuses. A 
reemployment bonus would cost no more than $1,200 per participant, while wage insurance 
could cost up to $10,000 or more during a two-year eligibility period.  Reemployment bonuses 
also have been analyzed as add-on programs to the regular UI program, and only would be 
offered to UI claimants likely to exhaust their entitlement to regular UI benefits through the 
Worker Profiling mechanism, which would also reduce costs. By comparing the two treatments, 
one a reemployment bonus and the other a wage supplement, a determination could be made 
about which approach is most effective and efficient. 
Finally, wage supplements could be tested in combination with other reemployment 
services. The effects on American dislocated workers might be similar to the effects on Canadian 
welfare recipients who benefitted from the provision of additional employment services in 
addition to an earnings supplement in the SSP Plus component of the Self-Sufficiency Project 
(Robins et al. 2008).  In the United States, job search assistance services could be added to the 
offer of a wage supplement. 
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SUMMARY 
Over the past three decades, there have been many proposals for implementing wage 
supplement programs.  Almost all of the proposals have had two goals: 1) speeding the return to 
work of dislocated workers, and 2) temporarily reducing the monetary loss that many workers 
experience when they return to work. Yet it still is not known if wage supplements would 
accelerate the return to work in the United States and who would benefit from the wage 
supplements. 
Wage supplement proposals have differed with respect to the problems that they try to 
solve, either to gain support for freer international trade or to reduce the post-unemployment cost 
to all dislocated workers. Most of the proposals have had similar specifications, but some have 
suggested variations, such as the duration of supplement payments or replacement rates. 
Despite the policy discussions of the past two and a half decades, wage supplements have 
not been tested as a random assignment experiment in the United States. While a small, targeted 
wage supplement program exists in the TAA program, it has not been studied and little is known 
about how well it works. 
One issue that has not been seriously considered, for example, is the qualification period. 
Many authors have accepted a 26-week qualification period during which individuals would have 
to have taken a job if they were to receive wage supplements. Twenty-six weeks was the 
qualification period in the Canadian demonstration, but it would be too long in the United States 
if wage supplements aim to speed the return to work and reduce UI-compensated durations of 
unemployment.  A 26-week eligibility period for wage supplements is likely to yield adverse 
behavioral responses since the potential duration of regular UI benefits generally is 26 weeks. 
40 
Wide disparities between the cost estimates of the various wage supplement proposals are 
a concern.  For example, the Kling wage insurance program was estimated to cost approximately 
$20 billion per year—about six times more than the estimates from Brainard (2006) and nearly 
three times as much as the LaLonde (2007) proposal. While some of these variations are based 
on design differences, it appears to be difficult to accurately estimate the cost of wage 
supplements until they are tested and evaluated. 
CONCLUSION 
For over three decades, policy makers have been concerned about the difficulty displaced 
workers have had returning to work and the earnings losses that they experience in their new 
jobs.  Wage insurance/supplements has been a policy response that has been considered and 
analyzed repeatedly during this period as temporary layoffs have diminished and permanent 
layoffs have become the rule. In response to numerous waves of displacement, many different 
approaches and designs for wage insurance have been considered. 
The Obama administration has examined wage insurance/supplements proposals and the 
one operational wage insurance program in the United States—Alternative Trade Adjustment 
Assistance program—and it has chosen a comprehensive approach for its wage insurance 
program design. The proposed program’s goal is to speed reemployment and reduce the 
associated monetary losses to displaced workers. The program would be targeted to all displaced 
workers whether they were adversely affected by international trade or not. The design 
parameters are similar to the ATAA program: displaced workers who return to work earning less 
than $50,000 and had worked for their prior employer for at least three years could receive half 
of their earnings losses up to a maximum of $10,000 over a two years eligibility period.  States 
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would be required to administer this federally-funded wage insurance program (White House 
2016).  The proposal does not currently specify how quickly displaced workers would have to 
return to work to be eligible to collect wage supplements. Enactment of this program would 
reveal how a wage insurance program like ATAA would work when made available to all 
displaced workers, regardless of age and regardless of the cause of their displacement. One thing, 
however, is clear. The program would substantially reduce the wage loss experienced by most 
reemployed displaced workers. 
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Domestic/Intl. Dom. Intl. D/I Intl. D/I Intl. Intl. Dom. Dom. Intl. Dom. Dom. 
 
Component 
            
Replace rate (%) — 50 and 
declining 
50 50 50 50 50 50 25 50 50 50 and 
declining 
Yearly max. ($) — — — 10K 10K 5K 10K 10K — 10K 10K 10K 
Earnings max. ($) — — — — — 50K — — — 50K — — 
Years of eligibility — Temporary — 2 yr. 2 yr. 2 yr. 2 yr. 2 yr. 6 yr. 4 yr. 18–24 mo. 2 yr. 
Time limited — — 2 yr. 2 yr. 2 yr. — 2 yr.+ — — — 18–24 2 yr. 
Replace — — — Trade Trade — — — UI — — — 
UI/trade             
 
Targeting 
            
Intl./all dislocated All Intl. All Intl. All Intl. All All All All All All 
Older/tenure — More to 
older and 
tenure 
— Age Vary with 
age and 
tenure 




Full-time/PT — — — — F/T — F/T F/T — — — — 
High Un-N — — — — — — — — — — — — 
Serious dislocation — — Yes — — — — — — — — — 
 
Financing 
            
General rev. — — — — — Gen R — — — — — — 
Special tax — — — — — — — —  Option — Payroll 
UI reduction — — — — — — — — Elimin Option — — 
UI waiting Wk — — — — — — — — — Option — — 
Reduce trg. — — — — — — — — — Option — — 
 
Admin 




Hourly — — Qtr./M — — — — — — — Week/ 
Month 
Cost ($) — — — — 2.3– 
3.0B 
— — 2.6– 
4.4B 
20B 7B — — 
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Table 2  Trade Adjustment Assistance Program Data, Fiscal Years 2000–2007 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 



















Percent 61 44 69 53 60 59 58 65 
Workers certified 98,007 139,587 235,072 197,359 149,650 117,904 120,199 146,680 
Workers denied 53,433 59,607 74,760 82,181* 56,444* 37,998* 49,292* 43,741* 
New income support recipient 
Number 32,808 31,459 37,426 44,136 81,248 55,293 53,493 47,048 
Percent of workers certified 34 23 16 22 51 54 45 32 


















Percent of workers certified 23 18 16 22 34 32 30 34 
New ATAA recipients         
Number — — — 288** 1,115** 2,349** 3,204*** 3,951**** 
Percent of workers certified — — — 0.15 0.75 1.99 2.67 2.70 
SOURCE: USDOL, ETA reporting system. 
NOTE: * Data are estimates and subject to change based on court decisions and other factors that could change the decision of a case over time. The workers denied numbers for 
2003 through 2007 were obtained in May 2008 and represent the results under the Trade Act of 2002.  However, information from 2000 to 2002 was based in the previous 
program.  ** Data based on estimates from informal state contacts in conjunction with funding information from the UI program.  *** Formal data collection began March 31, 




Table 3  Trade Adjustment Assistance Budget Authority and Outlays (millions of current dollars) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Income support and benefits       
Authority 283 275 284 720 1,069 750 655 572 
Outlays 272 259 249 339 520 637 707 566.1 
Training         
Authority 132 132 132 259.2 259.2 259.3 259.4 259.6 
Outlays 133 141 142 212 179 243 259 259.6 
ATAA         
Authority — — — — 10 48 52 23.5 
Outlays — — — — 2.2 48 52 23.4 
         
Total 415.2 406.6 415.6 972.2 1338.2 1057.3 966.4 837.6 
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